Institutional Adaptation to Changing Risk of Water Scarcity in the Lower Guadalquivir Basin by Giansante, Consuelo et al.
C. GIANSANTE,* M. AGUILAR,* L. BABIANO,**
A. GARRIDO,*** A. G6MEZ,*** E. IGLESIAS,***
W. LISE,*** L. MORAL,* B. PEDREGAL*
Institutional Adaptation to Changing
Risk of Water Scarcity in the Lower
Guadalquivir Basin*
ABSTRACT
Historically, the Spanish water management model's predominant
goal has been resource augmentation. This mindset has had
important consequences for the system's capacity to cope with
droughts. It has impacted the system's overall vulnerability, the
discourse of scarcity, the conceptualisation of risk, and the
stakeholders' interests and their approach to risk. The aim of this
article is to present the traditional hydraulic paradigm, and its
current crisis and implications for present and fiuture risk
management, and to explore stakeholder and institutional reactions
and adaptation to changing risk scenarios. The adaptation process
will be framed within the wider context of macro-trends, such as
marketisation and re-scaling of institutions and global warming.
INTRODUCTION TO DROUGHT AND SPANISH SOCIETY
This article will explore the management of water scarcity and
drought in the Lower Guadalquivir Basin within the broader framework of
the societal and institutional responses to climate change and to the
increased possibility of extreme hydrological events in Europe. The first
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important factor to note is the marked spatial and temporal climatic
variability of the Spanish climate. In Spain, the traditional water manage-
ment model, "hydraulic paradigm," has been resource-oriented.1 As a
result, the overall spatial development model of the country, including
agricultural, urban, and industrial sectors, is based on the social reconstruc-
tion of the water environment.2 This model has had important consequences
for the water system's capacity to cope with risk. It has impacted the
system's overall vulnerability, the discourse of scarcity, the conceptuali-
sation of risk, and the stakeholders' interests and approaches to risk.
The system has become more vulnerable or, at best, maintained its
level of vulnerability after each drought episode in the past few decades.3
The current strategy, which favours resource augmentation, has caused the
increased vulnerability. Encouraged by the misplaced perception of greater
security, abundance, and access, water "demand" has risen as additional
water supply has been made available.4 The socio-economic impacts of the
1990's drought demonstrate the strain on the water system. Several million
urban Andalusian consumers experienced service cuts of a maximum of 12
hours per day and thousands of irrigation farmers went without any
irrigation water for three consecutive years.5 The lack of irrigation water
caused direct losses of 3 to 4.2 billion Euros and also caused losses to the
20,000 farm workers who lost their jobs.6
Due, in part, to the water crisis brought on by the 1990's drought,
current water management practices have been intensely debated over the
last decade. Furthermore, the idea that the water system is in crisis is
gaining acceptance among both water managers and stakeholders.7 But, the
traditional paradigm still has institutional inertia and social support behind
it. The tension between the view that the water system is in crisis and the
institutional inertia and steadfast social support has resulted in an "unstable
stagnation" in Spain's water policy.'
This article examines the current water management paradigm's
ability, to cope with present and future risks and explores the process of
1. Leandro del Moral & David Saurf, Changing Course: Water Policy in Spain, THE
ENVIRONMENT, 12-15, July-Aug. 1999.
2. For the definition of social construction of the water environment, see Erik
Swyngedouw, Modernity and Hybridity: The Production of Nature: Water and Modernisation
in Spain 97-112 (1997) (unpublished report, on file with authors).
3. Monica Aguilar et al., Drought Risk in the Lower Guadalquivir Basin: Social and
Institutional Responses to Climate Change and Climatic Hazards, in SIRCH PROJECT FINAL REPORT
(Feb. 2001).
4. Id.
5. EMASESA, CRONICA DE UNA SEQUJA 1992-1995 49-50 (1997).
6. Id. at 105.
7. Aguilar et al., supra note 3, at 5.1.
8. Id. at ch. 3.
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institutional adaptation to changing risk scenarios. We tested the traditional
paradigm's ability to adapt by modelling different risk scenarios. These
scenarios incorporated the possible impacts of climate change on the overall
availability of water resources and on the frequency of extreme events.9
They also incorporate other macro trends that generate future uncertainty."°
THE INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE
Institutions, previously defined as regularised patterns of behav-
iour that can be formal, informal, strategic, or operational," are difficult to
capture because of the difficulty of defining clear boundaries and separating
different operational levels at the global, national, regional, river basin, and
local levels.'2 Therefore, the description of water management institutions
in this section will not be systematic. Instead, we will provide an institu-
tional landscape upon which it will be possible to observe the process of
institutional adaptation and change. At the formal, legal institutional level,
the cornerstone of Spanish water policy is the 1985 Water Act, which
established the current water management framework and conferred a key
role to hydrological planning. 3 The two main aspects of this legislation are
the water planning framework and the financial and economic public water
framework.
The Water Planning Framework
The main instruments of water management and planning
established by the 1985 Water Act are the national water plan, Plan
Hidrol6gico Nacional (PHN), and the river basin water plans, Planes
Hidrol6gicos de Cuenca (PHCs), for Spain's 17 river basins. 4 Through the
technical services of the Ministry of Environment, Department for Water
9. The Spanish climate change debate is still in an embryonic stage, but, if it has merit,
its implications for Spain's water system could be enormous. Francisco J. Ayala-Carcedo, De
la politica hidrdulica a la politica de agues sostenible, 90 TEcNOAMBIENTE 5-9 (1999).
10. Leandro del Moral et al., Global trends and management of climatic water risks, in SIRCH
FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at ch. 14.
11. This means that institutions/rules of behaviour can influence the general
strategy/perspective that should be adopted to tackle a problem (in this particular case,
natural resources management) or, alternatively, can mandate the operational rules that should
be applied.
12. See generally SIRCH, Societal and Institutional Responses to Climate Change and
Climatic Hazards: Managing Changing Flood and Drought Risk (Karen Bakker ed., 1998).
Institutions can also be described as regularised patters of behaviour, which are socially
constructed, both formal and informal, and relatively stable.
13. Ley De Aguas, B.O.E., 1985, 189.
14. Id. art. 38.2, 71.1.
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and Coasts, the central government is in charge of drawing up the national
hydrological plan. The river basin water plans (PHCs) are drafted by the
river basin authorities. According to water legislation, the main goals of
these documents are to forecast future water demands, to design plans to
meet those demands (generally ten and twenty-year planning horizons are
used), as well as to establish qualitative objectives for the basin's surface
water.15
The legal framework also asserts that Spain's water policy should
coordinate with other planning policies that may affect hydrological plans."
The other major planning policies that affect water management plans are
agricultural policy 7 and energy policy."8 The legal framework also requires
that national water policy not only coordinate with but must be compatible
with environmental conservation policies. 9
The process of drafting, discussing, and approving national and
regional river basin water plans is an extremely long, complex, and
continuous process. A first draft of the national water plan was presented
in April 1993.20 This draft was premised on the notion that the national
hydrological imbalance between water-rich and water-poor regions should
be corrected and proposed re-distributing water resources between basins
via a national water grid, Sistema Integrado de Equilibrio Hidraulico Nacional
(SIEHNA). 1 The 1993 draft also projected considerable increases in water
demand based on a projected increase in irrigation surface of 600,000 ha by
2012.22
This draft was widely criticized by various administrative sectors
and by the public.' In addition to the numerous and varied environmental
objections, the Ministry of Finance criticised the plan for its lack of financial
rigour and for its failure to coordinate with related sectors.24 Agricultural
15. Real Decreto de 29 de Julio, art.79.1, R.C.L., 1988,927.
16. Id. art. 95; Ley De Aguas, B.O.E., 1985, 189, art. 38.4.
17. Through the regional competence within the framework of the national economic
objectives and the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
18. The use of large volumes of water for energy production purposes (hydropower dams
and cooling systems) can generate conflicts with other use sectors, such as irrigation and urban
supply.
19. Ley De Aguas, B.O.E., 1985, 189, art. 40(d).
20. MINISTERIO DE OBRAS POBLICAS Y TRANSPORTES, PLAN HIDROLOGIcO NACIONAL
MEMORIA (1993).
21. Id. at 100-10.
22. 46 percent in domestic supply, 14 percent in irrigation agriculture and 25 percent in
industry for the year 2012.
23. Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, Libro Blanco del Agua 19-20, at
http://www.mma.es/rechid/librojb/sintesis.pdf (Dec. 4, 1998);VICrOR P aR-DIAZ ET AL.,
POLITICA Y ECONOMIA DEL AGUA EN ESPA4A 42-51 (1996).
24. PtREz-DIAZ Er AL., supra note 23, at 57.
[Vol. 42
INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION
experts, who criticized the Plan, were also concerned because this draft had
completely overlooked various macro-economic factors such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) treaty.' At the same time, regional
governments in "water deficit" river basins were clamouring for higher
transfer volumes.26 Meanwhile, outcry in water-rich river basins against the
transfer plan grew. In fact, one of the "water-rich" regions, Arag6n, where
most of the reservoirs of the Pyrenean mountainous region for the
nationwide water transfer system would be located, has campaigned
vigorously against the PHN project. As a result of the extensive criticism,
the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation prepared a scenarios
analysis document that slightly modified the criteria for future water
demand scenarios while maintaining the general priorities of the 1993
draft.27 Most importantly, the Spanish Parliament decided that approval of
the PHN should be conditioned on the approval of both a national
irrigation plan and on all the river basins' hydrological plans.'
The years following the publication of these two official documents
were characterised by instability and stagnation. During this period, which
coincided with the long and severe 1991-1995 drought, the water debate
became a high profile political issue.' The planning process had reached an
impasse. 3 The main opposition party at the time, the Partido Popular (PP),
blamed the planning impasse on the PSOE's 3' inappropriate water
management approach?2 In April 1996, a new government, led by the
conservative opposition party, Partido Popular, was elected with high
expectations.' Representatives of the newly created Ministry of the
Environment, MIMAM, promised rapid approval of the PHN during their
term. The mechanism for the approval was supposed to be enhanced
25. Id.
26. See, for example, discussion of the Andalucia regional government's demands for
higher transfer volumes in Joan Corominar, El Plan Hidrol6gico Nacional en Andalucia y la
Directive Marco sobre politica deaguas in NUNOGRANDE, PEDRO ARROJO, &JAViERMARTINEZGIL,
IL CONGRESO IeugIco SOBRE PLANIFICAION Y GESTION DE AGUAS 313-18 (2000), available at
www.us.es/ciberico.
27. SECRETARIA DE ESTADO DE POLfTcA TERRITORIAL Y OBRAS POBUCAS, MINsrKO DE
OBRAS POBuCAS, TRANSPORTEYMEDIOAMBIENTE, PLAN HIDROLOGIcONACIONAL, ANALISISDE
EscENARIos (1994). This document maintained the notion of national hydrological imbalance,
SIEHNA, and the priority given to large-scale infrastructure versus demand management and
control and water saving.
28. Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, supra note 23, at 410.
29. VICTOR Pftz-DfAz ET AL, supra note 23, at 59-67.
30. Id. at 69-71.
31. The PSOE is the Spanish socialist party.
32. Borrel modifica el Plan Hidrol6gico ante las criticas at Anteproyecto: El PP exige 1a retirada
del proyecto, EL PAIS, Mar. 23, 1994.
33. El gobierno desliza en el BOE sin debate un miniplan hidrolfgico de 216.000 millones, EL
PAIS, Sept. 8, 1998, at 22.
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dialogue.' The enhanced dialogue was to be supported by a white paper
on water. The white paper would be designed to reach consensus on what
criteria and priorities should guide the subsequent elaboration of water
plans.' But, at the same time, the Partido Popular was arguing that the very
nature of the water-planning framework needed to become more flexible
to allow for more room for economic management of the resource. 6
The Partido Popular never implemented the former approach.' In
August 1998, before the white paper on water was published' and before
the national irrigation plan was adopted," the government approved each
and every river basin water plan.' As approved, the plans were virtually
the same as the drafts from the early 1990s. 1' The new government justified
its surprising decision by characterizing the water plans as non-binding lists
of possible projects.'2 This characterization implied a significant change in
the role of hydrological planning, a change unsupported by any legislative
reform.
A few months later, in February 2000, the Ministry of Agriculture,
Food and Fisheries, MAPYA, tabled the national irrigation plan after a brief
round of informal contacts and consultation with the regions' and users'
associations.' Since the water basin plans were approved, there has been
a striking decrease in planned irrigation surface: the 1998 river basin water
plans envisioned 1,200,000 ha of new irrigation surface, but the national
irrigation plan of 2000 reduced this to 250,000 ha of new irrigation surface
34. Borrel modifica el Plan Hidroldgico ante las crfticas al Anteproyecto: El PP exige la retirada
del proyecto, supra note 32.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The White Paper on Water, that was only released by the Ministry of the Environment
(MIMAM) at the end of the same year (December 1998) after an extensive conceptual and
historical revision, still held as valid the high projections for future irrigation water demand
and surfaces included in previous water planning documents. In addition, it failed to provoke
the announced open and public debate, especially because it came too late to be really relevant
in the discussion on the river basin water plans. See generally MINSTERIO DE MEDIO AMBIENTE,
LIBRO BLANCO DEL AGUA EN ESPAIRA (1998).
39. Actually, a first National Irrigation Plan was tabled by the former government in
February 1996 and did not become operational due to the change in government in spring of
1996.
40. Real Decreto 1664, July 24,1998.
41. They had been previously discussed and endorsed by the National Water Council
(CNA) in April 1998, with the only negative votes from the representatives of the
environmental organisations.
42. Personal communication with Josd Luis Blanco, Water State Secretary (Mar. 1999).
43. This document was meant to comply with the March 22,1994, decision of the Spanish
Parliament, which urged the government to present a National Irrigation Plan before the
National Hydrological Plan could be approved, although the discussion in Parliament
occurred after the approval of the river basin water plans.
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by 2008." Furthermore, the new 250,000 ha figure includes 138,365 ha of
previously planned and partially implemented irrigation surfaces (regadios
en ejecuci6n); 79,426 ha of irrigation surfaces justified on social grounds
(regadfos socials); and 25,000 ha of private initiative irrigation surfaces."
The Ministry of Environment tabled a new draft of the PHN in
September 2000. This draft had substantially reduced the planned volume
of inter-basin transfers and concentrated the water transfer burden on one
"donor" basin, the Ebro river basin.' The .1993 draft of the national water
plan had originally envisioned anation-wide inter-basin transfer network
that would have transferred a total of 3768 Mm3. The 2000 PHN draft
eliminates transfers from the Tagus and Douro basins, which are shared
with Portugal, to Mediterranean basins.47 The only transfer the 2000 PHN
draft contemplates would be from the Ebro river basin to the Mediterranean
basins.4 According to the terms of the 2000 PHN, the Ebro basin would
have to transfer 200 Mm3 to the Catalonia basin, 400 Mm3 to the Segura
basin, 300 Mm3 to the Jitcar basin, and 100 Mm3 to the Sur basin, most
notably to the Almeria irrigation surfaces.49 The total transferred volume in
the 2000 PHN is just over half of the transfer volume set out in the 1993
draft.' Even so, the proposal has reopened old inter-regional wounds and
has aroused considerable political opposition from the regional government
of Arag6n, the Ebro basin's largest region."
The Economic Framework of Spain's Water Policy
The economic framework of Spain's water policy has traditionally
been based on two main features: a generous subsidy system and a water
rights regime. The subsidy system has allowed the proliferation of extensive
state-funded water regulation schemes and the water rights regime requires
44. Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, Plan Nacional de Regadfos 2000, at
http://www.mapya.es/indexa/busca.asp?sitio=http%3a2f%2fwww2emapya%2ees%2f
desarr%2fpags%2fpnr%2frega%2ehtm (last visited Oct. 28,2002).
45. Id.
46. Ministry of Environment, 2000, at http://www.mma.es/rec-hid/plan._hidro/
planhidro.htm.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The 1993 draft planned on transferring 1855 Mm3, 1.5 million acre-feet, of water to
water-poor basins, see MINISrERUO DE OBRAS PO UCAS Y TRANSPORTE, supra note 20, the new
draft only plans to transfer 1000 Mm 3, 0.81 million acre-feet, of water solely from the Ebro
basin. See Ministry of Environment, supra note 46, at 102-08.
51. Arag6n lider6 el "no" al transvase que inundd la Puerta del Sol, EL HERALDO DE ARAGON,
Mar. 12,2001, available at http://www.heraldo.es.
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all users of the public water domain52 to apply for a license to use water that
governs the terms of that use. The river basin authority' can grant licenses
for a maximum of 75 years and can only grant licenses for the uses set out
in the licensing document.5 Both the subsidizing and the licensing system
have been debated and partially revised in recent years.55
Traditionally, Spanish economic water regulation has been in line
with the principles of flexible supply and the belief that generous state
subsidies were necessary to overcome the serious economic and social
deficits affecting Spain at the beginning of this century.'
The 1985 Water Act established storage charges and rates, the canon
de regulaci6n y tarifas.57 The income from these fees is designed to help the
government recover the cost of its investments on dams and other
hydrological works, mainly canals,' as well as to cover their operation and
maintenance costs s9 Despite attempts to revise the old system of subsidies,
the 1985 Water Act only succeeded in maintaining it; the end result of the
charges and rates is to subsidise bulk water by about 40 percent of total
investment.' In general, these charges have been hard to apply and difficult
to collect.61 Furthermore, the funds they generate are manifestly insufficient
52. The 1985 Water Act established that all renewable freshwater--both surface and
groundwater-is part of the public domain.
53. The river basin authority grants licences based on a general order of preference
established by the Water Law: public supply (including industries connected to municipal
supply networks); irrigation and agricultural uses; electric supply; other industrial uses; fish
farming; recreational uses; navigation and river transport; and other uses.
54. Ley De Aguas, B.O.E., 1985,189, art. 57.4.
55. 1999 Water Act, B.O.E., 1999,298.
56. The cornerstone of this policy was the Large Hydraulic Works Act of 7 July 1911,
which defined four possible avenues for carrying out hydraulic works: (1) execution by the
private sector, with a state subsidy of up to 30 percent of the cost of large-scale hydraulic
works in addition to a premium payment (by the state) "per litre per second" for irrigation
water used; (2) execution by associations of irrigators, with a subsidy of up to 50 percent of the
cost; (3) execution by the state, with the support of the irrigators affected, with a subsidy of up
to 50 percent and low interest loans of up to 40 percent (most common choice); (4) executed
entirely by the state.
57. In addition, the 1985 Water Act also established the water domain occupation charge
(candn de occupacidn) for the physical occupation of parts of the water domain (river beds and
banks) and the water pollution charge (candn de vertido) for the protection of those watercourses
receiving polluting discharges.
58. Ley De Aguas, B.O.E., 1985, 189, art. 106.1 (canon de regulaci6n).
59. Id., art. 106.2 (tarifas de utilizaci6n).
60. All water facilities supplied by waterworks (dams, channels, etc.) are built and run
with public subsidies. This subsidy rises to 90 percent when the conditions of the Act of 1911
are applied.
"Bulk water" refers to all water that is transported in large-scale networks, before it
enters the end-user distribution networks. In the case of drinking water, this is before it is
treated for drinking water purposes.
61. Ministry of the Environment, 1998, supra note 38, at 556.
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to cover the amortized cost of investment in and operation of hydraulic
systems. 2
In addition to the charges applied to bulk water, urban and
agricultural end-users have to pay operation management and distribution
costs to water companies or to irrigation communities.' In most irrigated
zones, water prices are not assessed on the basis of the volume of water
used, but as a per hectare charge.6' Rates range from 6 to 198 $/ha.1 Due to
this variability in prices in each geographical area and the fact that each
farmer applies different volumes of water per hectare, the average price of
water, including bulk water and irrigation association charges, is difficult
to calculate. Based on the average consumption of about 7000 m3/ha, a
rough estimate of the price per cubic meter is 0.0158 $/m3 (0,0167 Euro/m);
however, this figure varies with crop differences.'
In the various drafts of the amendment to the 1985 Water Act
(1997-1999), several proposals were made to modify different aspects of the
water tariff system.6' But the only change in the final text of the amendment
approved in 1999 was one that introduced the obligation to meter water and
a system of incentives and penalties for users that deviate from a baseline
volume of water use.' The opposition of business organisations, agricul-
tural associations, and particularly of powerful hydropower interest groups
prevented the introduction of more radical changes, such as full-cost
recovery or a non-renewable resource/environmental impact surcharge for
water use.' While the tariff system has not significantly changed, the
mechanisms for financing public hydraulic works are likely to be affected
62. Ministry of the Environment, 1998, supra note 38, at 557. The amount is fixed and
updated annually, taking into account operation costs, 4 percent of the value of investments
made by the State-the technical amortisation of the works and installations--and the
depreciation of the currency. The total period of technical amortisation for investments is set
at 50 years for reservoirs and at 25 years for canals.
63. These costs, and the way they are calculated, vary greatly. In domestic uses, for
instance, prices vary greatly from one place to another, depending on several factors: water
municipal policy, bodies in charge of administration, costs of the service, level of waste water
treatment, and others.
64. Jos9 MARIA SUMPSI E" AL., ECONOMIA Y POLICA DE GESTION DEL AGUA EN LA
AGRICULTURA, at 148, 148-51 (1998).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Consuelo Giansante et al., L'" olution des modalits d'allocation de la resource en eau en
Espagne, 48 REVUE D'ECONOMIE MERIDIONALE (REM) 235, 235-48 (2000).
68. Id. at 240.
69. So far the prices paid for water use are only aimed at recovering-partially or
completely-the costs of provision, transportation, or treatment, but never to pay for the
resource itself; the access to which, though regulated by a water right system, is considered to
be free of charge.
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by the creation of private-public partnerships (Sociedades Estatales)70 that are
expected to increase user participation in the payment of waterworks."
The licensing system has also undergone changes. According to the
system established by the 1985 Water Act, transactions between different
license-holders or changes in the use of water were not allowed except in
special circumstances such as droughts or other emergencies.' Even then
these use changes required direct involvement of the administrativebody.'
The amendment of the 1985 Water Act, which was approved in December
1999, increases the system's flexibility and facilitates the transfer of water
rights by way of water markets and water banks.74
The legal possibility to establish water banks-although they have
not been created yet-was introduced by the 1999 amendment, largely
drawing on California's experience with water banks in 1991.7s Water banks
in Spain were inspired by the three general principles of the California
water banks: (1) urban users are the main beneficiaries; (2) urban supply
should not be guaranteed to the detriment of irrigation farmers, who should
be compensated; (3) water banks can be used to store volumes of water as
a preventive measure in case of a long-lasting drought. The water banks are
designed to be "centres of exchange of water rights" in cases of drought or
other exceptional circumstances.' These exchange centres would be set up
by agreement of the Council of Ministers pursuant to a proposal by the
Minister of the Environment." In this case, the relevant river basin authority
would be in charge of making public offers for the acquisition of water
rights that may later be ceded to other users at the price established by the
river basin authority itself. Although the idea remains untested, water
banks are one way to encourage more efficient, voluntary transfers between
users.
70. The Sociedades Estatales were created within the auxiliary regulation of the General
State Budget of the year 1997 (Law 13/1996, art. 158).
71. Giansante et al., supra note 67, at 243-45.
72. Ley De Aguas, B.O.E., 1985, 189, art. 56.
73. Ley De Aguas, B.O.E., 1985, 189, art. 61.
74. Giansante et al., supra note 67, at 238-39; 1999 Water Act, B.O.E., 1999,298, art. 61 bis.
75. Water management schemes in California and Spain have often been compared due
to their geographical and climatic similarities. Furthermore, the positive results derived from
the experience with water banks (regulated markets, limited in time and space) in California,
compared with more controversial experiences with water markets elsewhere, such as Chile,
may have reduced the social opposition to this type of measure. Water banks in California
were, therefore, perceived as a model to follow, in order to enhance the flexibility of the water
rights' system (especially to cope with droughts), without necessitating the need to privatise
water resources. Ministry of the Environment, 1998, supra note 38, at 757-58.
76. 1999 Water Act, B.O.E., 1999,298, art. 61.bis. 11.
77. Id., art. 61.bis. 11.
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A more controversial form of temporary exchange of water rights
between users, not necessarily limited to drought situations, was introduced
by the 1999 Water Act: water markets. These formally maintain the public
water domain institution, but they also establish the possibility of water
transfers by means of the temporary surrender of rights from one right-
holder to another within a set of limitations. The first limit is that the
licensees may only cede water to other right-holders of equal or higher
priority in the river basin's plan. For example, an irrigator can sell his
water to another farmer or to an urban supply but not to a recreational or
industrial user unless the temporary transfer is in the public interest.' The
second limit on the transfers is that the licensees of non-consumptive water
uses, such as hydroelectric power, are not allowed to transfer their water
rights.' Finally, the state must be informed of the content of the contract
and is entitled to assert the right of first refusal, as well as to cancel
contracts contrary to planning goals or contrary to public interests."'
KEY STAKEHOLDERS INTERESTS AND APPROACH TO RISK
Stakeholders, individuals, organisations, as well as decision and
policy makers, who determine resource use and exposure to hazards,82
provide a prism into the institutions that govern water management.
Stakeholders create the rules, the norms, and the shared strategies83 that
constrain their responses to hydrological risks events. For this reason, a
description of the actors, as well as an analysis of their interests, values, and
approaches to risk is necessary to understand their relationships to water
and risk management institutions.
In Spain, the governmental responsibility for water management
lies with river basin authorities (Confederaci6n Hidrogrdfica).' These
organisations have a relatively long historical tradition (since 1926) and,
according to the 1985 Water Act, are responsible for the control of public
waters; for granting licenses and permits for its use; for elaborating the
basin water plan; and for the design, development, and management of
78. Id., art. 61.bis.l.
79. Id., art. 61.bis.12.
80. Id., art. 61.bis.l.
81. Id., art.61.bis.2 & art. 61.bis.3.
82. See generally KAREN BAKKER Er AL., ADAPTIVE RESPONSES TO HYDROLOGICAL RISK: AN
ANALYSIS OF STAKEHOLDERS, SIRCH WORKING PAPER No.6 (Consuelo Giansante ed., 2000).
83. See generally SIRCH, supra note 12.
84. Here risk is considered to be both a physical reality and a social construction, as well
as a central locus for de/construction of institutions within society. For a comprehensive
review of the approaches to risk, see generally SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK (Sheldon Krimsky &
Dominic Golding eds., 1992).
85. Ley De Aguas, B.O.E., 1985, 189, art. 19-20.
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hydraulic works." The decision-making process of the river basin authori-
ties allows for some participation by user groups and representatives of
different central and regional government bodies through a complex
internal structure." This structure is made up of several advisory and
consultation committees such as the water release commission and the
water management board.' Additionally, the Spanish state has a complex
territorial structure with autonomous regions that have a wide spectrum of
decision-making powers.'
In inter-regional basins, those whose territory is shared by two or
more autonomous regions, the river basin authority is directly dependent
on the central government, particularly on the Ministry of Environment
(MIMAM). On the other hand, the river basin authorities in intra-regional
basins, whose territory is completely confined within one autonomous
region, should be transferred to the regional government.91 Both from an
institutional and from a political perspective, the dynamics between central
and regional government responsibilities are a crucial issue in the Spanish
water debate.92
Although general water management in inter-regional basins is the
responsibility of the river basin authorities and, thereby, the central
government, regional governments still have some residual control over
some aspects of water management. For example, they control urban water
supply, sewage collection, and wastewater treatment. Also, the Autonomy
86. Id., art. 21.
87. See generally Consuelo Giansante, In-Depth Analysis of Relevant Stakeholders: The
Guadalquivir River Basin Authority (Mar. 18,1999) (unpublished paper, on file with authors).
88. Ley De Aguas, B.O.E., 1985, 189, art.24-37. At the national level, the National Water
Council (Consejo Nacional del Agua), headed by the Minister of the Environment, with
representatives of central and regional governments and water users, is in charge of examining
and approving (although its opinion is not binding) the proposals for both the National and
the River Basin Water Plans before they are submitted to the government (Council of
Ministers).
89. Spanish Constitution, C.E. Titulo VIII.
90. Ley De Aguas, B.O.E., 1985, 189, art 15(c), (d).
91. The 1985 Water Act establishes that intra-regional basins can be managed and
controlled by the regional government. Id. art.16. However, this option must be implemented
with the agreement of both the central government and the region involved, which would then
approve the decree at the central and regional level, respectively. This has not yet been the case
for all intra-regional basins in Spain.
92. See generally Leandro del Moral, Problems and trends in water management within the
framework of autonomous organization of the Spanish State, in LIVING WITH DIVERSITY, XXIX IGU
CONGRE.SS: SEOUL 2000, at 617-36 (2000).
93. Real Decreto Ley 11/1995 establishes the general guidelines and quality objectives for
wastewater treatment. Since 1984, Andalusia has been responsible for technical and economic
assistance to the municipalities, including urban supply,. As a result, in 1991 the Andalusian
regional government approved the Reglamento del Suministro DomiciliariodeAgua, establishing
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Act (Estatuto de Autonomfa) gives regional governments responsibility for
agricultural, environmental, and land use planning policy, which are
indirectly related to water management." Although the regional govern-
ment (Andalusian Department of Public Works and Transportation) has co-
ordination functions, the ultimate responsibility for urban and drinking
water supply, sanitation, and wastewater treatment lies with local
councils." Water services may be managed directly by the local council or
indirectly via mixed enterprises, concessions, and leasing.*
In recent years, several water supply systems have been transferred
to private management, causing a heated debate largely over the transfer's
pricing effects." In Seville, urban water management is in the hands of three
public companies and a private concession-holder. The three public
companies are Empresa Municipal de Aguas de Sevilla, S.A. (EMASESA),
Aljarafe S.A., and the Consorcio del Huesna.9 EMASESA supplies 12
municipalities, including the city of Seville, and the Water Company
Aljarafe, S.A." The Consorcio del Huesna, a consortium of 13 municipalities,
has granted a 25-year concession for urban water supply to the private
concession-holder, Aguas del Huesna.'re
general criteria for urban water supply.
94. The Andalusian Autonomy Act was approved in the Ley Orgdnica de 30 de diciembre
1981. Presently, the main departments involved with water management within the
Andalusian government are the Departments of Public Works and Transportation; Agriculture;
Environment; and Health. In July 2000, a specific Secretariat for Water Affairs, directly under
from the Presidency of the Andalusian regional government (Consejerfa de Presidencia de la Junta
de Andalucia), was created with the mandate to co-ordinate the water-related responsibilities
of the departments of Public Works, Agriculture, and Environment.
95. Ley 7/1985, de 2 de abril, Reguladora de las Bases del Regimen Local.
96. Daniel Femndez Pdrez, Financiacin de los Servicios Urbanos del Agua (Dec. 18, 1994)
(unpublished paper, on file with authors).
97. The level of participation of private companies in the Spanish water sector (urban
water supply) currently represents 10 percent of the towns and 36 percent of the population.
98. Luis Babiano, Discursos sobre naturaleza y conflictos entorno al agua en situaciones de
"escasez." El caso del abastecimiento de Sevilla, in IX Congreso de Antropologfa, Barcelona, (Sept.
4-7, 2002), at http://www.ub.es/ica/congreso; Consuelo Giansante, Metodologia para la
evaluacidn socioecon6mica y medicambiental de diversas opciones de gesti6n del agua. Aplicaci6n a tres
casos de estudios, in DG OBRAS P(MUCAS, JUNTA DE ANDALUClA 108-09 (1999); Consuelo
Giansante et al., El sistema de abastecimiento de Sevilla: andlisis de situaci6n y alternativas al embalse
de Melonares, IN SERIE INFORMmEs, NUEVA CULTURA DEL AGUA (Leandro del Moral ed., 1998).
99. Babiano, supra note 98; Giansante, supra note 98; Leandro del Moral, supra note 98.
100. Babiano, supra note 98; Giansante, supra note 98; Leandro del Moral, supra note 98.
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Policy Community
Beyond the statutory organisations responsible for different aspects
of water management, water stakeholders can also be studied as a policy
community. 1 The water policy community is a close-knit, cohesive
network of actors who believe in the interests and values that have
traditionally controlled Spanish water policy. 2 It is made up of the road,
canal, and port engineers' corps; agricultural organisations; construction
companies; electrical companies; and key members of the hydraulic
administration. 3 Some actors and approaches to water management have
been included in the water policy community, while others have not> 4 A
sector that has traditionally been excluded and, to a large extent, remains
excluded from the water management and planning process is the
groundwater sector, most notably the Spanish Institute for Technology and
Mining (ITGE).105
The economic and environmental analysis of water development
projects has traditionally been excluded from consideration by the water
policy community because augmenting available water resources has been
considered a good in and of itself that did not need economic or environ-
mental justification."' In general, user participation has been limited to
select user groups, mostly comprised of irrigation farmers, who participate
in the consultation-only committees of the river basin authorities, which
have little decision-making power °7
Nonetheless, the irrigation farmers are one of the most important
groups of water users." Within this sector, the irrigation communities
(Comunidades de Regantes) are responsible for water management at the
single irrigation district level under the supervision of the river basin
authority."° They also participate in the consultation bodies of the river
101. Seegeneralky POUTICSOFCUMATE CHANGE: A EuROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (Tim O'Riordian
& Jill Jager eds., 1996); PtEZ-DIAz ET AL., supra note 23.
102. PeREZ-DfAZETAL., supra note 23, at 40-41.
103. Id. at 51-56.
104. Leandro del Moral Ituarte et al., Actores, normas, prdcticasydiscursos en la asignacidn del
agua en sequlas. Aplicacidn al Guadalquivir, 94 REvisTA DE LA REAL AcADEMIA DE CIENCIAS
ExAcAs, FfsicAs Y NATURALES 287,291 (2000).
105. Some developments can be observed in this field, such as the inclusion of the ITGE
(which formerly belonged to the Ministry of Industry) within the responsibility of the Ministry
of the Environment, established in 1996.
106. Pedro Arrojo, El Plan Hidrol6gico Nacional, in EcOLOGIA PoLrITCA 20(2000).
Augmentation is achieved by increasing storage facilities and public works construction to
make more water available for consumption.
107. BAKKER ET AL., supra note 82, at 27.
108. See generally del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104.
109. BAKKER ET AL., supra note 82, at 11.
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basin authorities and other interest groups.' For example, a large portion
of the Guadalquivir basin's irrigation communities is represented by the
Guadalquivir Irrigation Farmers Union (Federacidn de Regantes del
Guadalquivir)."' The Federaci6n was created in 1995, in the wake of the 1990's
drought, and brought voting unity and internal cohesion to the sector."'
Farmers' unions are also active interest groups in water policy, both at the
regional and at the national level."' More recently, in 1994, an umbrella
organisation, Plataforma por el Guadalquivir, was created in the Guadalquivir
basin."' Plataforma por el Guadalquivir gathers together a wide variety of
actors such as farmers' organisations and unions, local and county councils,
trade unions, and political parties who actively support the construction of
more dams as the main solution for the Guadalquivir basin's "structural
water deficit.""'
The formation of the Federaci6n and of the Plataforma is an
expression of the traditional water policy community's resistance to new
processes that include new actors and new water management approaches
in the water policy arena. The new processes have begun to undermine the
strong internal cohesion of the community as well as its basic social values.
For example, environmental organisations are gaining momentum and,
although consumers are still largely excluded from formal decision making
in the field of water allocation, a limited number of representatives of
environmental organisations have been recently admitted to river basin
consultation committees."" The European Union's responsibility for
coordinating agricultural policy and increasing responsibility over water-
related issues is also making the water policy community more diverse."
7
Finally, the recent trend of using economic criteria to evaluate water policy
has begun to weaken one of the pillars of the traditional hydraulic
paradigm, the provision of abundant water at nearly no cost to the users
demanding it."8
Another threat to the irrigation communities' traditional views
came in 1996 when the government paved the way for the creation of
mixed-capital, public/private companies (Sociedades Estataes) that will be
110. Id.at9,12.
111. FEDERACION DE COMUNIDADES DE REGANTES DE LA CUENCA DEL GUADALQUIVIR,
DOSSiER wFoRmAnvo (n.d.).
112. del Moral Ituarte et at., supra note 104, at 295.
113. BAKKER ET AL., supra note 82, at 12; del Moral Ituarte et al., at 294-95.
114. del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 295.
115. http://www.sevsigloxxi.org/plataforma.
116. BAKKER ET AL., supra note 82, at 8-9.
117. Jos6 Maria Sumpsi, Gestin del agia y polftica agraria, in PLANIFICACIN HIDROLOGICA
Y POLTJCA HIDRAUUCA: EL LIBRO BLANCO DEL AGUA 257,258-59 (1999).
118. Arrojo, supra note 106.
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responsible for assisting the river basin authorities with the construction
and management of public water works."9 The creation of such companies
at the river basin level is based on a contract (convenio) between the state
administration and the mixed capital company 20 The contract governs
construction and management conditions for waterworks as well as
financial contributions made by the state and private sector. Several of these
mixed capital companies have already been created; for example, the Aguas
de la Cuenca del Guadalquivir S.A.' 2 was set up in the Guadalquivir basin in
1999. This legislation reflects the impact of global changes that will be
explored further in the next section.
THE WIDER CONTEXT OF CHANGE
The ongoing and likely future changes in the drought management
practices in the Guadalquivir basin are embedded in the general processes
occurring at the global scale, the macro trends that affect the basin in
different ways." Out of the general landscape of change, five macro trends
that are particularly relevant for the field of water management can be
identified.
The first macro trend, which is observable both in Spain as well as
in other countries, is a building atmosphere that favours solutions that
incorporate "scarcity indicators," market instruments, and gives private
business a larger role, what could generally be defined as marketisation.'"
These solutions include economic analysis of water uses and full cost
recovery, both of which would change the current concept of water deficit
and would also change how drought coping mechanisms are prioritised."
These solutions have important consequences for infrastructure, which is
119. Art.158, Law 13/96 (auxiliary regulation of the General State Budget of 1997) of 1996;
Karen Bakker, From state to market?: Water mercantilizacid6n in Spain, 34 ENV'T & PLAN. A 767,
777-79 (2002).
120. BAKKER ET AL., supra note 82, at 8.
121. The statutes of the company establish as one of its objectives the "management of
works and water resources, including environmental management of aquifers, lagoons,
reservoirs, rivers and stretches of river, as well as the preparatory or complementary activities,
derived from the former ones," thus opening the field of water management to private
regulation.
122. Following the structural theory of A. Giddens, locale is a consubstantial factor in the
constitution of social action. It is not just a mere spatial parameter, a physical environment
where interactions happens, it is formed by all the elements mobilized as part of the
interaction. See generally del Moral et al., supra note 10.
123. Bakker, supra note 119.
124. Arrojo, supra note 106.
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presently stagnating due to financial cutbacks."2 At the same time, market
instruments are gaining legitimacy, although the Spanish people still have
strong objections to treating water just like any other commodity. 26
As a second general trend, decision-making powers are being
transferred in two different directions. They are, moving towards the
regional scale and towards the international scale. This process has been
defined as re-scalingY1' The increasing political role of the regions makes
water policy a flashpoint for confrontation between regional and central
governments."l Meanwhile, increasing international interaction is also
impacting Spanish water policy. First, the global trend towards liberalising
the economy affects agriculture and water policy decisions and has
consequences for the local economy.'29 At the same time, international
political power centres like the European Union have become key local
actors."0
The EU has two primary watermanagement responsibilities. Its
first task is to grant subsidies that partially cover the costs of large water
works. "' But it has also made a general commitment to sustainable use of
natural resources and is responsible for protecting the environments of
designated sites that may be adversely affected by such waterworks. 2
125. The reduced willingness and ability of the state to fund waterworks is part of a general
trend to reduce public sector spending and to de-invest in strategic sectors. Bakker, supra note
119.
126. Rechazo undnime a la reforma de la Ley de Aguas propuesta por Isabel Tocino, LA TIERRA,
July-Aug. 1997, at 22; Diario de Sessiones del Congreso de Diputados, 17 junio 1999 (no. 247:
13157-13176); 30 de septiembre 1999 (no. 263:13988-14003).
127. E. Swyngedouw, Neither global nor local: globalisation and the politics of scale, in THE
GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL: MAKING THE CONNECTION (K. Cox ed., 1997).
128. This is exemplified by the contrast between the expansive approach of the river basin
water plans-where regional governments and local stakeholders are most influential--and
the conservative national irrigation plan, which is more conditioned by the logic of market
liberalisation.
129. Sumpsi, supra note 117.
130. Asger Olsen, The New Water Framework Directive for the European Union-Main
principles and obligations. Prospects for a sustainable water policy for the coming decades, in O'PORTO,
UNA CITA EUROPEA CON LA NUEVA CULTURA DEL AGUA: LA DIRECTIVA MARCO, 25 (2001).
131. The economic and social cohesion between the regions of the European Community
was one of the objectives included in the Treaty of Rome in 1986. As a complement to the
Treaty's single market, opening up frontiers would expose the most disadvantaged countries
to further problems. This is pursued, among other instruments, through European Regional
Development Funds (ERDF)-75 percent EU and 25 percent member state
contributions-which are limited to less-favoured regions (such as Andalusia) and are focused
mainly on productive investments and infrastructure.
132. Article 6 of the Treaty of Amsterdam of the European Union states that environmental
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of
community policies. Consequently, the European Commission must ensure that projects
developed under regional policy are respectful of the environment. An assessment of their
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The third macro trend relates to ongoing, worldwide changes in
how nature is represented, particularly representations of the cultural and
symbolic value of water.'33 These changes are crucial in Spain and in the
Guadalquivir basin because these values are the cornerstones of the
traditional hydraulic paradigm.TM The traditional paradigm is founded on
a system of deeply rooted values about the relationship between nature and
society, 35 which views the natural water environment as a hostile setting
whose splendour and beauty is enhanced by human intervention.1 "M
Another cornerstone of the traditional hydraulic paradigm is the notion that
nature is an obstacle to social and economic progress and must be
transformed to achieve modemisation.'1 Hence the fascination with inter-
basin water transfers; the traditional view sees these transfers as-a way to
progress by overcoming hydrological imbalances, a natural obstacle to
socio-economic modernisation."
The fourth macro trend is increased participation in the water
policy arena.' In particular, the transition to democracy (in 1977-1978) had
major impacts on the political, social, and institutional characteristics of
Spanish life."4 While this trend has allowed a greater number and variety
of actors to feel involved in the water debate, the inclusion/exclusion
process is dynamic and some stakeholders continue to be excluded. 4'
Finally, there is an observable attempt to better coordinate different
sector and governmental department policies-at least at the discursive
level, both in Spain and in Europe as a whole.Y For example, the need to
environmental impact must be conducted by the member states concerned. Additionally, DGXI
(Environment) of the European Union is responsible for the drafting and implementation of
a number of Directives on environmental protection and water, such as the Water Framework
Directive.
133. Del Moral, supra note 10, at 4, 12.
134. Id.
135. Babiano, supra note 98, at 11-13.
136. This is how human-built water landscapes associated with irrigation (orchards and
domesticated water) come to be valued as ideal and positive images of development,
overriding the possible negative impacts on the wider natural environment.
137. E. Swyngedouw, Modernityand Hybridity: Regeneracionismo, the Production ofNature and
the Spanish Waterscape, 1890-1930, 89 ANNALS ASS'N AM. GEOG. 443, 443-65 (1999); Babiano,
supra note 98.
138. Id.
139. Del Moral, supra note 10, at 5, 19.
140. RAYMOND CARR & JUAN PABLO FUSI, ESPARIA: DE LA DICTADURA A LA DEMOCRACIA
(1979); VicToR P9REZ DlAz, LA PRIMAcIA DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL (1993)
141. BAKKER zr AL., supra note 82, at 27.
142. At the European level, a number of initiatives are underway aimed at the coordination
of environmental protection with other development and sectoral policies. See EUROPEAN
CONSULTATIVE FORUM ON ENVIRONMENT & SUSTAINABLE DEv., THE EUROPEAN SPATIAL
PERsPECnIvE(1999),at http://www.europa.eu.int/conmm./regional-policy/sources/docoffic/
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horizontally integrate water policy and agricultural policy is an important
issue in Spain."4 Integration is important enough that in 1994 parliament
asked the Spanish government to set out a national irrigation plan before
parliament made any decision about a holistic national hydrological
policy.'" Of course this is not the only way to achieve policy integration;
political and academic discourses often cite spatial planning as another
means of achieving this goal. 4s
PHYSICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
OF THE BASIN
Physical Characteristics of the Lower Guadalquivir Basin
The Guadalquivir Basin has a total catchment area of 57,071 km2
and the river itself is 640 km long. The source and estuary of the river are
both located within the Spanish region-of Andalusia, but a small part of the
catchment area (about 10 percent) is located in three other Spanish regions,
Extremadura, Castilla-La Mancha, and Murcia (Figure 1). In its last
stretches, the Lower Guadalquivir Basin (LGB) covers an area of 17,085 km2
that includes the Andalusian capital, Seville (Figure 1).
The mean annual precipitation in the Guadalquivir basin is 596
mm, which is relatively high compared to the central Spanish mesetas or to
southeastern Spain. However, the main feature of Andalusia generally and
of the LGB is spatial and temporal irregularity. The mean annual
precipitation ranges from about 1500 mm in the mountainous areas to
400-600 mm in the Guadalquivir depression.'" The lowlands in the eastern
part of the basin receive less than 400 mm of mean precipitation a year. 47
official/reports/pdf/p32_en.pdf; Cohesion Funds and the environment, at http://www.
europa.eu.int / comm / regional-policy /sources/ docoffic /official/ communic/
envir/home.en.htm). At the Spanish level, the White Paper on Water, see Ministerio de Medio
Ambiente, supra note 22, can be interpreted as an effort to coordinate different expertises and
policy fields related with water. Finally, in Andalusia the creation of the Consejo Andaluz del
Agua in 1996, Decreto 202/1995, de 1 de agosto, and, more recently of a specific Secretariat for
Water Affairs, directly dependent from the Pridency of the Andalusian regional government
(Conserifa de Presidencia de la Junta de Andalucia) are seen as efforts to coordinate the water-
related responsibilities of the departments of Public Works, Agriculture, and Environment.
143. Irrigation agriculture uses about 80 percent of the total water resources in Spain;
therefore, the agricultural policy will necessarily greatly affect water use. Ministry of the
Environment, supra note 38, at 384419.
144. Id. at 410.
145. Federico Aguilera Klink, Hada una nueva economia del agua: cuestionesfundamentales,
at http://habitat.aq.upm.es/boletin/n8/afagul.html (May 16,2002).
146. Aguilar et al., supra note 3, at 13.
147. Id.
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Figure 1. Map of the Guadalquivir basin within Andalusia and Spain
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This variability is aggravated by the fact that the region's mean potential
evapotranspiration is inversely proportional to mean annual precipitation
with extremely high values in the dry lowlands (sometimes more than 1000
mm) and lower values in the wetter mountainous regions.1"
Temporal irregularity has two components, seasonal or intra-
annual variability and inter-annual variability, and is similarly distributed
both in the dry and in the humid areas of the Guadalquivir basin.14 The
intra-annual variability of precipitation is typical of the Mediterranean
area."5° The seasonal pattern includes a dry season of five to six months
when evapotranspiration exceeds precipitation and a rainy winter season,
whichbrings most of the annual precipitation.' The range, persistence, and
extreme values of inter-annual variability are also extremely high.
According to long series of data from meteorological stations, the
precipitation values can range from 800 mm to 1100 mm from one year to
another.152 While precipitation can vary widely from year to year, it is also
true that years with extreme (either low or high) precipitation values tend
to be concentrated over time. This concentration aggravates the effects of
droughts. Lastly, torrential precipitations can be extremely intense:5 in
most of the Lower Guadalquivir basin it can rain up to 150-200 mm in
twenty-four hours (between one-third and one-half of the total annual
precipitation).154
The mean annual renewable or natural water resources55 are
estimated at about 7000 million cubic meters/year (5.6 million acre-
feet/year).'" But this varies widely from year to year and can range from
1 to 17,000 million cubic meters/year (13.6 million acre-feet/year).1 5'
Furthermore, the spatial and temporal climatic variability mean that only
a portion of these natural resources are actually available at the time and in
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 19.
153. Torrentiality is defined as the total precipitation in a year (nam) divided by the number
of days of rain. Id.
154. Id.
155. For surface water, annual renewable or natural water resources can be defined as the long-
term average freshwater volume supplied naturally by the hydrological cycle, derived from
the total run-off (surface and underground) resulting from rainfall over a river basin territory
minus evapotranspiration.
156. CONSEJERIA DE OBRAS POBLUcAs Y TRANSPORTE DE LA JUNTA DE ANDALUCA, PLAN
DIREcTOR DE INFRAESTRUCTURAS DE ANDALUCIA 43 (1998).
157. Id.
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the place required.'" These available resources (recursos disponibles) are
obviously affected by technological constraints, as well as by socio-
economic and institutional considerations.'" Most of the available water
resources in the Guadalquivir Basin"6 are derived from surface water,1 61
while only a small portion comes from groundwater.162
In order to deal with its irregular precipitation, the Guadalquivir
River is regulated through a network of reservoirs throughout its basin."6
The reservoirs help to partially control the naturally erratic Mediterranean
precipitation regime by storing winter flows for later use. With more than
60 reservoirs, the basin's reservoir capacity totals 6833 million cubic
meters/year (5.5 million acre-feet/year)."' About one third of this volume
(2255 million cubic meters/year 65 or 1.8 million acre-feet/year) is available
as average annual regulated flow.'" Most of the reservoirs are located in the
Sierra Morena area, whose impermeable soils and topographic conditions
make it ideal for water storage.67
Important Water-Users in the Lower Guadalquivir Basin
The most important factor in the water resources use and planning
in the Guadalquivir basin is the prime importance of irrigation agriculture,
both in terms of water use'" and in terms of contribution to the Final
Agricultural Production (PFA) of Andalusia.'" Data on the basin's irrigation
158. Available water resources, or the average annual regulated flow, can be defined as the
average water volume stored in the reservoir in a year. It is determined by the reservoir
capacity, its goals and management pattern, including the level of guarantee of the use for
which it is aimed and the hydrological regime of the river basin in which it is located, taking
into account the pre-existing reservoirs and other human modifications.
159. That is, availability depends on the technical capacity to build dams and inter-basin
transfer systems as well as on the socio-economic and institutional factors (legal provision,
financial support, agreements between regions, etc.) that allow for the actual implementation
of these technical measures.
160. A total of 2700 million cubic meters/year, equivalent to 2.1 million acre-feet/year is
usually available.
161. 84 percent or 2255 million cubic meters/year, equivalent to 1.8 million acre-feet/ year
is available from surface regulation.
162. 16 percent or 437 million cubic meter/year (0.35 million acre-feet/year) comes from
groundwater abstraction.
163. CONSEJERIA DE OBRAS POBLICAS Y TRANSPORTE DE LA JUNTA DE ANDALUCIA, supra note
156, at 44.
164. Id. at 43.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 44.
168. 85 percent or 2847 million cubic meter/year, equivalent to 2.30 million acre-feet/year.
169. With an irrigation surface that represents 19 percent of the total agricultural land, this
sector contributes about 53 percent of the Andalusian PFA (Producto Final Agricola).
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surface is disparate. Official.estimates have been about 668,000 ha, but
another 20 percent of the surface might be used for unlicensed irrigation.70
Within the basin's irrigation system, the irrigation of rice paddies in the
Guadalquivir river estuary (about 35,000 ha) is crucial: its importance arises
from its high unitary -water use (9.6,acre-feet/ha) and its location in the
lower stretches of the Guadalquivir River, which is affected by the tides. 7'
From April to September, the rice irrigation period, large volumes of water
must be released from the upstream reservoirs of the basin to lower the
salinity in the estuary." During droughts, this release of water creates
conflict between the rice growers and the rest of the basin's irrigation
farmers.1
73
Although the urban sector demands less water (12 percent of total
demand) than the irrigation sector, its needs are also critical to planners
because it requires a guaranteed supply of high quality water year-round.
Three water companies, EMASESA, Aljarafe S.A., and potentially the
Consorcio del Huesna, supply the 1.3 million occupants of the Seville
metropolitan area with 130-150 million cubic meters of water/year or 0.10-
0.12 million acre-feet of water/year. 74 The Seville water system has
experienced serious water shortage problems during each of the 1972-1974,
1981-1983, and 1991-1995 droughts. During the last drought, in addition to
severe water rationing measures (between 6 and 12 hours a day), Seville
had to use low-quality water from the Guadalquivir River.75 While the river
water was mixed with varying proportions of better quality reservoir water
or groundwater, its use still had a negative impact on the quality of potable
water.76
The importance of accurately anticipating changes in demand is
underscored by the pace of increased demand over the past few decades.'"
While industrial demand represents only a minor proportion of total water
use, there has been a considerable increase in agricultural and domestic
demand over the past few decades.' These demands have been met by the
170. Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 207, 210. The illegal irrigation surface can be
derived from the difference between the irrigation surface cited in water management
documents (668,000 ha) and the 1999 Andalusian Inventory of Irrigation Agriculture, which
estimates the total irrigation surface at 815,000 ha, thus including illegal (i.e. unlicensed)
irrigation surfaces.
171. CONFEDERACION HIDROGRAFICA DEL GUADALQUVIR, PLAN HIDROLOGICO DEL
GUADALQUIR 50(1995).
172. Id. at50.
173. del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 211.
174. Giansante et al., supra note 98, at 6.
175. BAKKER ET At, supra note 82, at 28.
176. See id. (discussing flexibility in water quality standards during times of drought).
177. Ministry of Environment, supra note 38, at 339-42, 385.
178. Id.
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resources in the Basin's extensive network of reservoirs." The total
available water resources in the Guadalquivir basin represent as much as
40 percent of the total natural water resources.8 ' (See Table 1.) But, this is
still insufficient to meet present demand.18' Present demand outpaces
available resources in the Guadalquivir river basin by 241 million cubic
meters (0.2 million acre-feet/year) according to the Andalusian Department
of Public Works and Transport. " Furthermore, draft national and river
basin hydrological plans, and other strategic planning documents, project
significant increases in domestic, agricultural, and industrial water demand
both in the Guadalquivir river basin and in the rest of Spain.' '
Unsurprisingly, demand projections are the most controversial aspect of the
water resources planning debate in Spain.
Table 1. Basic Data on Water Resources in the Guadalquivir Basin
Natural water resources 5.6 million acre-feet/year
Total available water resources 2.1 million acre-feet/year
- Surface water 1.8 million acre-feet/year
- Groundwater 0.35 million acre-feet/year
Total number of reservoirs 60
Reservoir capacity 5.5 million acre-feet/year
Modelling the Economic Impact of Drought and Current Water
Management Strategies on the LGB
The LGB region's remarkable variability has historically had
important implications for the institutions that must try to manage the
irregularity and deal with the risk of water scarcity.' But so far, few
evaluations of the socio-economic impacts of droughts exist. Furthermore,
179. CONFEDERACION HiDROGRAFICA DEL GUADALQUIVIR, supra note 171, at 72.
180. CONSEJERIA DEOBRAS PBLICASYTRANSPORTE DE LA JUNTA DE ANDALUCIA, supra note
156, at 43.
181. Id. at 61.
182. Id. These estimates are part of the political debate on water and vary according to the
circumstances. For example, in a recent document the Andalusian regional administration
accepts the estimate of the Guadalquivir River Basin Plan, according to which the water deficit
in 1992 was 602 million cubic meters or 0.5 million acre-feet. CONSEJO ANDALUZ DEL AGUA,
ANDALUCIA Y EL PLAN HIDROLOGICO NACIONAL (2000).
183. CONFEDERACION HIDROGRAFICA DEL GUADALQUwIR, supra note 171, at 51-63.
184. Aguilar et al., supra note 3, at 51-52.
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other than some partial analyses of the urban supply service failures and
drought impacts on the irrigation sector, no comprehensive effort has been
made to completely evaluate the economic, impact of the 1991-1995
drought."5 For the lower Guadalquivir basin, however, a mathematical
programming model was recently developed to evaluate the economic
impacts of the drought."8 The model is based on realistic assumptions about
farmers' ability to anticipate water shortages and labour and capital market
rigidities."8 7 It also makes assumptions about how farmers revise their
production plans as new information becomes available." In Table 218 we
summarise the results of the simulations carried out for representative
farms in two irrigation districts of the lower Guadalquivir basin.
The relationship between social droughts, failures in the water
system that impact society, and meteorological droughts, precipitation
irregularity, is non-linear and depends on social, institutional, and physical
processes.se Run-off derived reservoir inflows largely depend on soil
moisture and rainfall regimes.1 91 Table 3 shows the complex links between
purely meteorological processes and hydrological outcomes. A simple
comparative analysis of the data regarding the conversion of one unit of
rainfall into units of reservoir inflows between the year 1989-1990 and the
year 1992-1993 shows a sharp contrast.192 In 1989-1990,1.41 units of rainfall
generated one unit of reservoir inflow, but during the first year of the
1991-1995 drought 32 units of rainfall were required to generate a unit of
185. EMASESA, supra note 5.
186. See generally Eva Iglesias et al., Evaluation of drought management in irrigated areas,
(Oct. 19,2000) (unpublished paper, on file with authors).
187. Ministry of the Environment, 1998, supra note 38, at 345.
188. Id. at 340.
189. As used in Table 2, "stock" stands for the percentage of stored volumes over storage
capacity of the reservoir(s) that service each irrigation district at the beginning of February;
"water allowance" is the per hectare irrigation water volume supplied in each irrigation
season. Whereas the previous two variables are derived from actual data on the decisions
made (water allowance) by water managers in the Guadalguivir basin based on specific
reservoir levels (stock)-the following variables are calculated by the model. "Shadow price"
represents the dual value associated to the water availability allocated to farmers each season,
"gross margin" is the difference between total revenues and variable costs, "net benefits" are
defined as the difference between total revenues and variable costs, and "value of production"
stands for the market value of the agricultural output. Finally, "hired labour" is the amount
of person-days per hectare generated by external workers.
190. Ministry of the Environment, 1998, supra note 38, at 167,250.
191. Ministry of the Environment, PLANHIDROLOGICONACIONAL, ANALJISDE LOS SISTEMA
HiDRAuucos 210 (2000).
192. EMASESA, supra note 5, at 53.
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reservoir inflow. Knowledge of these differences can help planners address
the socio-economic impacts of droughts. (See Table 3.)
Table 3. Rainfall and Reservoir Inflows in Rivera de Huelva
1988- 1989- 1990- 1991- 1992- 1993- 1994- 1995-
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Rainfall(mm) 554.5 1028 5111 464 396 518.6 291.9 84.6
Reservoir inflow (Hm) 146.5 727.5 106.4 33 12.4 109.1 13.3 581.3
Rainfall/Reservoir 3.79 1.41 4.82 14 31.9 4.75 21.9 1.45
inflow
Source: EMASESA (1997).
Parameters and Results of Water System Reaction to Hypothetical Risk
Scenarios
In order to better understand the enormous impact that water
management strategies and climate changes can have on the possible
availability of water in the Lower Guadalquivir Basin, we designed
simulations that model their effects. The simulations examine the possible
benefits of employing a water-saving strategy as well as the possible risks
associated with failing to plan for climate change. The results of these
simulations are discussed below.
The simulated 1991-1998 period has three identifiable stages. The
first stage corresponds to the beginning of the meteorological drought
(1991)."9" The second stage corresponds to the most severe hydrological
drought (from 1993 to 1995).194 The third stage corresponds to a very wet
period that resulted from abnormally high rains during the autumn of 1995
(from 1995 to 1998).195 Although the drought had a significant impact on the
farming sector, the magnitude of its effects on farmers, farm workers, and
193. Meteorological drought occurs if rainfall is significantly less, during a certain time
period, than the average amount in a specific area. Aguilar et al., supra note 3, at 22.
194. Hydrological drought relates to shortages in the flow of water, which then fails to
meet the existing demand for water. Hydrological drought may be delayed with respect to the
onset of the meteorological drought, mainly due to the existence of storage facilities and
depending on the current water management rules. Id.
195. Iglesias et al., supra note 186, at 15.
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the regional/national economy varied in different degrees."s For instance,
in 1993 and in 1995, farmers in the El Viar irrigation district (EV)
experienced greater reductions in net benefits than hired labourers did."
The largest reduction, 50 percent, in the market value of production
occurred in 1993 and in 1995.198 Farmers fared worst in the 1995 season
when they could only grow rain-fed crops but remained responsible for the
financial obligations acquired in that and the previous two seasons.' (Table
2)
In the Bajo Guadalquivir (BG) irrigation area, farmers experienced
even greater difficulties with negative net benefits in 1992 and in 1993, but
they broke even in 1995.2' External farm workers were almost completely
idle in both 1992 and 1993,1 although the hired labour levels recovered
slightly from 1993 to 1994.m However, the reduction in the market value of
production was smaller than the reduction in net benefits and hired
labour.2' (Table 2)
The 1994 season, in which both districts received some irrigation
water, deserves closer attention. ' The El Viar district, which had its water
allowance reduced by 36 percent, performed as well in 1994 as in any wet
season with respect to the three most significant variables, net benefits,
value of production, and hired labour.2'5 In the Bajo Guadalquivir district,
where water allowances were reduced 81 percent, the net benefits only fell
50 percent, the market value of production only fell 60 percent, and labour
demand only fell 75 percent as measured against 1990-1991, the best year
of the sequence.' 6 These relatively positive results can be partially
explained by that season's high commodity prices, particularly for cotton.2'
In this instance, lower, drought-level production drove prices up, and the
relatively high seasonal hiring rate for horticultural crops, on which
196. Id. at 17.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. By differentiating between net benefit and value of production, we seek to highlight
the differential impacts of drought on the farming economy and society in general. The market
value of the agricultural output provides a better indication of how the processing sector and
the food demand may have been hurt by limited water resources for irrigation.
204. Iglesias et al., supra note 186, at 17.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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irrigators concentrate their limited resources, helped reduce the impact on
hired labour during 1994.2m
These simulations also demonstrate that choosing excessive water
releases over saving water causes significant benefits to vanish. The low
shadow value of water during the 1990 to 1991 pre-drought period reveals
that saving water for a possible future drought would have cost very
little.' Meanwhile, the decreasing volumes of water left in the reservoir
during these same periods probably signalled an imminent hydrological
drought and indicated that a water saving strategy could produce
significant benefits. The potential benefits of saving water would have
vanished only if torrential rains filled up the reservoir to the point where
water had to be released to prevent flooding. That scenario was highly
unlikely since the Bajo Guadalquivir reservoirs were at 27 percent of their
capacity in February of 1991.210 At that moment, one unit of water saved
had an opportunity-cost of 0.13 Euros/m 3, but reached a shadow value of
0.43 Euros/m 3 in the next season.211 These results clearly show the economic
irrationality of past management of water stocks and suggest that different
water management approaches could reduce the regional impact of
meteorological droughts.
Global Warming
The current vulnerability of the water system would definitely be
exacerbated by global warming, which would increase the present levels of
uncertainty. According to the 1995 projections of the national
meteorological institute (INM), global warming will cause an increase of
two to 2.50 C in temperature by mid-century and concomitant decreases in
precipitation in different Spanish regions.2" So far, the INM's temperature
projections have been confirmed by the statistically significant upward
trends (about 1 C) that occurred during the period from 1961 to 1990.3
During this time, minimum temperatures experienced the highest
increases.214 Both the decrease in precipitation and the increase in
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Two percent in the northern regions, 17 percent in the southern basins, and 15 percent
in the Guadalquivir basin.
213. These results are from specific studies based on historical climatic records in
Andalusia performed at the Department of Geography of the University of Seville. See generally
Camarillo Naranjo et al., Homogenisation process and temporal patterns of historical
temperature records in Andalusia (unpublished paper presented at the International
Conference on Climate Change, May 31-June 3,2000) (on file with authors).
214. Id. at 11.
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temperature that global warming is expected to bring will reduce natural
water resources.
Using the INM's 1995 projections as a baseline, the overall potential
reduction has been estimated at 17 percent for the whole country and 34
percent for the Guadalquivir basin by the year 2060.215 The 1998 white paper
on water216 estimated an eight percent reduction in natural water flows in
the Guadalquivir basin for the 2030 horizon assuming a temperature
increase of 1 C, which was modelled in scenario one.217 The estimated
reduction rapidly rose to 20 percent in scenario two, which assumed a
temperature increase of 1' C plus a precipitation decrease of five percent.
As for the potential reduction in available water resources, some estimates
project as much as a 39 percent reduction in available water for regulated
resources whose water demands are stable over the year, such as urban
water supply.218 At the same time, resources that supply variable or
seasonal demands such as irrigation could drop by 22 percent.219
A CENTRAL LOCUS FOR ADAPTATION:
WATER (RE-)ALLOCATION
An institutional analysis can identify specific institutional aspects
that are crucial to understanding the process of how institutions learn and
adapt to drought. In the lower Guadalquivir basin, the central locus for
exploring the responses to drought is the set of norms, rules, and practices
regulating water allocation between users. In Spain, regulating water
allocation between users is achieved by defining unitary (per capita or per
hectare) water allowance during the general water planning process.'
River basin water plans include recommended theoretical irrigation water
allowances by crop type and irrigation district as well as a population-based
water allowance for domestic supply."2 Theoretical water allowances aside,
the temporal irregularity of the Spanish climate means that in some years
the unitary water allowances cannot be supplied. The acceptable level of
215. Francisco Ayala, De la polftica hidrdulica a la polftica de aguas sostenible, 90 TECNOAM-
B IEWE 5 (1999).
216. Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, supra note 23, at 259-61.
217. Ayala, supra note 215.
218. Id.
219. Id. Note that this evaluation does not take into account the evaporation losses from
reservoirs and wetlands that would also increase with temperature increases.
220. del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 288-90.
221. CONFEDERACION HIDROGRAFICA DEL GUADALQUIVIR, supra note 171, at 52,55.
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guarantee, which dictates how often water shortages can occur, is
established by law' and is used by water planners as a guide.'
Within a specific river basin consultation committee there is usually
some room for negotiation in the resource allocation area: for example, at
the beginning and end of each irrigation season, the dam water release
commission, Comisi6n de Desembalse (CD)2"' discusses proposals for filling
and emptying the reservoirs.2 In the case of an official drought,2  a
permanent commission of the river basin's managing board, the Junta de
Gobierno, can be set up. The permanent commission has the power to reduce
or stop any water use in the basin. It also has the power to obligate users to
install water meters as well as the power to build small water schemes in
emergencies.7
Although it possesses paltry decision-making powers, the
irrigation-dominated water release commission is an important means of
institutionalising the hegemony of irrigation sector values and objectives
within broader water policy and within society. The allocation decisions,
pressure mechanisms, arguments, and strategies used in the course of the
1990s drought brought the internal cohesion and external legitimisation of
the irrigation community to light.' 8 These features of the irrigation
community are extremely important because they are closely tied to the
survival of the traditional water community.'s
The traditional water community is in crisis. The erosion of
irrigation agriculture's role in society brought on this crisis. Its decline was
exacerbated by socio-economic and cultural factors' and by internal
222. Ministerial Order of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Sept. 12,1992).
223. This is used mainly to calculate the dimensions of water storage reservoirs needed to
regulate a certain volume of water with the level of guarantee established by law.
224. The members of this commission are representatives of the river basin authority,
central government, and water users of the basin. The representatives of the water use sectors
are appointed by the Management Board on proposal of the Assembly of Users and are
appointed according to the water volumes used; therefore, the irrigation sector makes up the
vast majority of this commission.
225. Giansante, supra note 87, at 15-16.
226. A Drought Decree defines the geographical areas affected by drought, defines
compensation to the farmers sector in the form of exemption from the payment of certain taxes,
and enables the river basin decision-making bodies to impose restrictions and reduce irrigation
water allowances.
227. Giansante, supra note 87, at 10-12; Real decreto 531/1992, de 22 de mayo.
228. del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 296.
229. This is due to the historical links existing between the irrigation community and the
traditional water community. See PMEZ-DIAz Er AL., supra note 23.
230. Rapid dissociation of the population from the rural realm and gradual de-
legitimisation of the agricultural sector as a whole, partially due to the increase in subsidies
based on agricultural surfaces rather than real production, resulting from European
agricultural policies.
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fragmentation. 1 The main divisions in the traditional water community
run across the following lines: (1) differences between legal and illegal
irrigation farmers,; 2 (2) differences related to the size of agricultural plots;
(3) differences between upstream and downstream irrigation farmer
interests; (4) differences related to specific water requirements, especially
to irrigation technology; (5) differences related to the crop types; and (6)
differencesbetween the interests of surface water and groundwater users.'
While the differences in agricultural plot-size were an important
fragmentary force during the drought of the 1990s,2m at present the most
salient fragmentary force comes from differences in water demand.
Demand is directly related to an irrigator's levels of technology and
efficiency and may be a key impetus for future change.m
The technological divide within the irrigation community has major
implications for the management of water stocks. New districts that have
high efficiency conveyance and distribution systems can function better
with limited resources, while older irrigation districts need larger water
volumes to function well.' As a result, districts with newer technology
tend to favour smaller water allowances and endorse more conservative
strategies for managing water stocks while districts with older equipment
oppose water allowance reductions because they lack the technology to
adequately adapt to that change.'3
The irrigation sector's dynamism was demonstrated during the
1999 irrigation season, which was a breaking point for traditional water
allocation practices.' As a result of a very dry autumn and winter, the
water regulation system of the Guadalquivir basin had only 12,000 m3/ha
of water left at the beginning of the 1999 irrigation season.' Initially, the
Guadalquivir river basin authority proposed releasing one-third of this
volume, 4000 m3/ha, during the current season, in exchange for a
231. del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 292-94.
232. This is an extremely relevant issue due to the importance of illegal irrigation (both in
terms of total surface and water use) and lack of control in the basin.
233. Generally, when this was possible, farmers opted for the drilling of (mostly illegal)
wells in order to cushion the consequences of the restrictions or the general irrigation ban.
Given the almost complete lack of control of groundwater abstractions, the Guadalquivir river
basin authority (CHG) and its participatory bodies almost renounced consideration of the
groundwater cycle, except in the last and most dramatic phases of the last drought.
234. del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 294. The plot-size split was exemplified best
by the debate on the allocation of water according to social criteria.
235. del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 293.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 295
238. Id. at 298-99.
239. Minutes of the Water Release Commission (Mar. 1999) (confidential document, on file
with authors); del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 298-99.
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guaranteed irrigation supply of 4000 m3/ha for the following two years.'
This strategy would have reduced the future, risk to the irrigation
community in the event of a new multi-annual dry spell. The irrigation
sector rejected this proposal outright and pressured the river basin
authority into granting a 6000 m3/ha water allowance in March of 1999.4
In July of 1999, this volume was increased to 8000 m3/ha.242 For the first
time in the Guadalquivir basin's recent history, the decision to increase the
irrigation water allowance garnered harsh social and political criticism.'
Although this started to open a fissure in the hegemonic discourse, the
situation is still very fluid.
All of these characteristics paint a portrait of an extremely dynamic
irrigation sector that exhibits divergent approaches to water allocation, to
its collective bargaining strategies, and to its discourses. It is important to
note that although water allocation is a basic function of water
management, the discourses favouring water re-allocation as an instrument
to cope with water scarcity have only recently emerged.2' The water re-
allocation discourse often diametrically opposes the dominant discourse,
which favours resource augmentation as the definitive solution to Spain's
structural water deficit.2
Game Theory Analysis of Farming Sector Incentives and Strategies
Using the water allocation proposals and practices from the 1999
irrigation season, we used game theory to analyse the incentives and
strategies of the farming sector regarding water allowances.'" A static two-
agent game where two farmers compete for water resources yielded
240. Minutes of the Water Release Commission, supra note 239; del Moral Ituarte et al.,
supra note 104, at 298-99.
241. Minutes of the Water Release Commission, supra note 239; del Moral Ituarte et al.,
supra note 104, at 298-99.
242. Minutes of the Water Release Commission, (July 1999) (confidential document, on file
with authors); del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 298-99.
243. A local newspaper published on its front page the following headline: "The same
volume as a six year water supply for the city of Seville was diverted for irrigation purposes."
See Desviada para regadlo tanta agua como Sevilla consume en seis ailos, DIARIO DE SEVILLA, Sept.
1, 1999. The new element is the shift in focus from a claim for more reservoirs-as a solution
to the drought-to the critique of how the remaining water had been managed and allocated,
with a special concern for the possibility of a failure in the urban supply system.
244. del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 299-300.
245. The concept of structural water deficit and the treatment of uncertainty within Spanish
water planning is analysed in Leandro del Moral Ituarte & Consuelo Giansante, Constraints to
Drought Contingency Planning in Spain: the Hydraulic Paradigm and the Case of Seville, 8 J.
CONTINGENCIES & CRIsIS MGmT. 93(2000).
246. See generally Weitze Lise et al., A game model of farmers' demands for irrigation water
from reservoirs in Southern Spain (Mar. 23, 2000) (unpublished paper, on file with authors).
Summer 2002]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
different equilibria across the three irrigation districts to which the game
was applied, Bajo Guadalquivir, El Viar, and Genil-Cabra. Farmers in a self-
managed irrigation district such as El Viar tend to be conservative and save
water in the reservoirs for the next seasons. But; in centrally managed
irrigation districts, such as Bajo Guadalquivir and Genil-Cabra, farmers
tend to demand water instead of saving it.247
Modeling farmers' strategies as a repeated game enabled us to
analyze how the preferences for a high-demand strategy depend on the
inherent risk level of the hydrological variables. Under the current
conditions, a repeated game demonstrates that a more demanding strategy
is optimal for farmers in both types of irrigation districts.2 8 However, an
extreme climate change scenario that substantially increases the risk of
drought creates an incentive for farmers to become more conservative-
assuming there are enforceable rules to protect farmers' water rights.249 This
indicates that farmers actually do react to present hydrological risks, but
just not enough to achieve equilibrium with climatic patterns. These
findings support the hypothesis that more transparent water rights that
spell out the rights and duties of the water system beneficiaries may create
a greater incentive for farmers to accept proposals that manage water stocks
over time, such as the one made by the Guadalquivir river basin authority
in 1999.' Specifically, if farmers' water rights were guaranteed across
seasons they would be much more willing to cooperate with more
conservative strategies than in the current system that pools unused water
rights allocations from previous years and new inflows before beginning
the allocation process for a new year."
EVALUATING THE WATER ALLOCATION DECISIONS IN THE
LOWER GUADALQUIVIR BASIN
To evaluate the efficiency of the water allocation decisions made by
water managers in the lower Guadalquivir basin in the 1991-1998 period,
we created an Economic Drought Management Index (EDMI) and applied
247. Self-managed irrigation districts (for example El Viar) are here defined as those districts
whose supplies depend exclusively on one reservoir and are only aimed at irrigation purposes.
On the other hand, centrally managed irrigation districts (for example Bajo Guadalquivir) depend
on a large number of reservoirs throughout the basin, which are shared with other irrigation
districts and water use sectors (for example, urban supply). In both cases, the management of
water stocks is supervised by the river basin authority.
248. Self-managed districts and centrally-managed districts.
249. The farmers are facing a so-called prisoner's dilemma.
250. Lise, et al., supra note 246, at 244.
251. Id.
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it to data from the area.- 2 The index adds an economic dimension to
climatic and hydrologic information and can assist water managers by
providing information about the economic risk of their strategies along with
the cost of reducing that risk. The main appeal of the EDMI is that it
combines four key pieces of information in an easily interpretable index: (1)
the structural constraints of a supply system based on reservoirs, (2) the
stochastic nature of natural run-offs flowing into the storage facilities, (3)
the institutional rules that have been followed by water managers during
the periods of historical record, and (4) the benefits accruing to the
consumptive users.
An EDMI result uses the ratio of the present use-value of water and
the expected use-value of the water left in stock to provide a measure of the
opportunity cost of employing a more conservative, water-saving
management strategy. An EDMI ratio of one indicates that the water
management strategy is perfectly efficient because the opportunity-cost of
saving the water equals its expected use-value for the following irrigation
season. If the EDMI ratio is less than one, the cost of saving one water unit
is less than the expected use-value for the following year and reveals that
the water managers are having an exceedingly risky management
behaviour. If the EDMI ratio is greater than one, the opportunity-cost of
saving one water unit is greater than the benefits it would generate the
following year and water should be used in the current season. Table 4
reports the EDMI ratios calculated for the El Viar (EV) and the Bajo
Guadalquivir (BG) irrigation districts, using data available for each of the
nine years from 1990 through 1998.
Table 4. Actual EDMIs for the EV and BG Supply Systems (1990-1998)
Year EV BG
Stock on Water EDMI Stockon Water EDMI
Feb. 1 (% of allowance Feb. 1 (% of allowance
capacity), (acre-feet/ha) capacity)' (acre-feet/ha)
1990 91 7.54 0.170 37 5.01 0.030
1991 60 5.88 0.650 26 4.42 0.080
1992 42 4.60 0.640 21 2.54 1.040
1993 13 0.62 3.820 15 0.06 36.180
1994 35 3,86 0.806 18 0.73 6,350
1995 9 0 9.540 11 0 11.890
1996 95 5.80 0.760 36 4.76 0.66
1997 92 5.90 0.182 89 6.39 0.007
1998 93 5.90 0.750 87 7.05 0.940
'Source, Unpublished repot iuixvr river bas
252. See generally Eva Iglesias et al., An Economic Management Index to Evaluate Irrigators'
Vulnerability to Water Shortages (Oct. 19, 2000) (unpublished paper, on file with authors).
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The EDMI values reported on Table 4 show several cases of
inefficient management. To be fair, please note that the EDMI ratios were
computed based on average inflow values that did not anticipate the early
1990s drought. Even so, EDMI ratios in 1991 are less than one in both
districts, indicating a need for lower water allowances in the 1991 irrigation
season. The reservoir inflows for the 12 months following February 1,1991,
were below average, resulting in lower stock values on February 1, 1992,
than in the previous year. However, the EDMI ratio for the Bajo
Guadalquivir district hit its optimal value in 1992 with a water allowance
of 2170 m3/ha, which was historically low but efficient. El Viar's 1992 and
1994 decisions contrast sharply with that efficiency. The 1992 EDMI ratio
was 0.64; the 1994 (a year between.two extremely dry ones) EDMI ratio was
0.80. Although Bajo Guadalquivir EDMI'ratios have been very high since
the hydrological drought started in 1992 and until its end in 1995, when
rainfall levels recovered, throughout the drought period no action could be
taken to move them closer to one simply because there was no water left in
the reservoirs. That said, the Bajo Guadalquivir district in 1990 and 1991
was managed with EDMI ratios close to zero, when stocks were at 37 and
26 percent of reservoir capacity respectively. If water managers had reacted
at the time, the effects of the severe 1992 to 1995 droughts might have been
partially mitigated or put off until the last two years of the drought period.
All EDMI ratios after 1996 are less than one in both irrigation
districts. This indicates that both systems are running inefficiently and at
very high risk levels. These results also indicate that, so far, water managers
have taken entirely too much risk. The high risk level suggests that lower
maximum water allowances are acceptable and that a conservative, water
saving strategy should be implemented as soon as reservoir network water
levels start to drop.
The EDMI ratios confirm our initial hypothesis that the current
rules for irrigation water allowances and for managing reservoir water
stocks are highly inefficient. It also suggests that the recent amendment to
the Water Act, which timidly introduces water markets, may fall short of
expectations because water right holders are not given sufficient guarantees
of ownership over the resources left in the reservoir. This uncertainty makes
it unclear whether the water left will be available either for sale in the
market or for future consumption. This effectively limits the role of the
market to the allocation of the resources available in a single irrigation
season. The single season focus distorts scarcity signals, which may give
incentives to defer consumption at the onset of droughts and soften the
supply variability inherent to the Mediterranean climate.
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CATALYSTS AND INHIBITORS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
There are identifiable catalysts for change within the lower
Guadalquivir basin that are likely to influence the water system's ability to
cope with present and future risks. In this regard, even though climate
change is not yet a major catalyst for change in Spain, it may significantly
affect future water management scenarios.' Climate change has either
been ignored or written off as an environmentalist concern. Although it has
recently aroused greater interest,' its possible effects continue to be
excluded from discussions of present water management options.'s This
attitude is fuelled by the perception that the existing uncertainties the water
planning process faces, such as estimating present water resources,
projecting socio-economic trends, projecting water demands, predicting
short term horizons, lack of control, and lack of credibility are greater than
climate change uncertainties.' In point of fact, water mangers tend to view
the current imbalance as a good proxy for an intermediate climate change
scenario.2 However, in the short term, climate change is not likely to be a
catalyst for change, as what is perceived as a chronic water deficit seems to
be a more urgent issue to tackle.
One of the factors likely to enhance adaptation in the drought
management practices is growing public, expert, political, and media
awareness of the continuing crisis the present water system faces.' This
crisis is often blamed on the uncontrolled expansion of irrigated land over
the past two decades.' The most recent drought has played a key role in
253. Ayala, supra note 215.
254. The issue of climate change is considered in the White Paper on Water and in the last
draft of the National Hydrological Plan (Sept. 2000) and is receiving increasing attention in the
media and expert circles.
255. The climate change scenarios have not been considered in the estimate of future
available water resources in any planning document. See CONFEDERACION HIDROGRARCA DEL
GUADALQUIviR, supra note 171.
256. These ideas are derived from a seminar on climate change organised by the Seville
SIRCH team, to which several experts and water managers from the basin were invited. See
SIRCH, WORKSHOP ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER MANAGEMENT SCENARIOS IN THE
GUADALQUIVIR BASIN (June 6,2000) (unpublished report, on file with authors).
257. From this perspective, the problems related to climate change are perceived as present
and urgent. This paradoxical relationship with the subject shows the very imprecise
information generally available and the lack of reflection regarding climate change. At present,
the idea that the variability of rainfall and temperature and the persistence of dry spells have
increased over the last three decades in the Guadalquivir river basin has been accepted in
climate research and water management circles.
258. See generally, Juan L6pez Martos, Los problemas del agua y su gesti6n en el territorio
andaluz, in ll CONGRESO IBtlCO SOBRE GEsTR)N Y PLANFICAcKiN DEL AGUA (2000), available at
www.us.es/ciberico.
259. Id. at 256.
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increasing awareness of the weakness of the present management system.0
Although extreme events and crises can trigger change, they exist within a
specific social-institutional setting. In Spain, the backdrop is a "structural
deficit" one in which droughts are viewed as circumstantial expressions of
a chronic water shortage.'
This social understanding of droughts as a symptom or expression
of chronic shortage makes it easy to neglect important planning areas like
contingency planning and crisis management. This view has also made it
easier to rationalize and to justify both a dangerous demand-hungry
mindset 262 and a vigorous infrastructure building strategy by the state.2"
However, the pervasive confidence in the system's robustness that existed
before the 1990's drought contrasts sharply with the present awareness of
vulnerability.' As a result of that drought, two innovative approaches have
gained support and may enhance future adaptation to uncertainty and risk.
The two approaches are drought contingency planning and the reallocation
of water between sectors and user groups.' The latter mechanism falls
under the more general marketisation trend,' but they also reflect a
stronger commitment to guaranteeing a basic urban water supply in
drought situations even in the face of pressure from the irrigation sector.267
Possibly the greatest potential for the water system in the lower
Guadalquivir basin to adapt to scarcity comes from reduced irrigation that
could result from agricultural policy changes or water rate increases.26
Although full cost recovery, FCR,26 is unlikely in either the short or
medium term, some price increases and changes in the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), which would liberate significant water volumes,
260. del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 298-99.
261. del Moral Ituarte & Giansante, supra note 245, at 94-95.
262. Id. at 95-96. A similar analysis is performed on discursive mediation of droughts in
California in L. Nevarez, Just wait until there is a drought: mediating environmental crisis for urban
growth, 28 ANTIPODE 246-72 (1996).
263. del Moral Ituarte & Giansante, supra note 245, at 99-100.
264. Id. at 98.
265. BAKKER ET AL., supra note 82, at 27,63.
266. Discourses favouring the reallocation of water according to social criteria have given
way to the introduction of market instruments as the main methods for enhancing flexibility
and efficient resource allocation.
267. The experience of the 1981-1983 and 1991-1995 droughts-when millions of
households suffered from water cut-offs and poor water quality-and of the 1999 irrigation
season-when water managers' decisions on the allocation of water to farmers have been
harshly criticised-played a key role.
268. Sumpsi, supra note 117.
269. About 80 percent of the value of production in half of the 600,000 ha of irrigation
surfaces in the Guadalquivir basin comes directly from subsidies of the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) and only about 25 percent of these irrigation surfaces would be able to subsist
under a scenario of full cost recovery (FCR).
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are very likely.' These changes, however, are highly dependent on
institutional arrangements and are causing and will continue to cause great
social resistance.27'
The greater awareness of vulnerability, the prospect of changes in
water use patterns, and the promotion of inter-sectoral water allocation and
contingency planning notwithstanding, significant portions of the
traditional water paradigm persist unchanged and are poised to resist
change, even when it appears necessary to cope with water scarcity. The
main sources of resistance; in the Guadalquivir basin are aligned with
various features of the traditional water policy community. The traditional
engineering mindset and long-standing support of structural solutions to
water scarcity continue to hinder serious consideration of other alternatives,
such as temporary re-allocation, contingency planning, or managing
demand.2' In particular, structural solution supporters view demand
management as possible and even necessary but ultimately insufficient to
address the "structural deficit." ' Additionally, the still very low water
prices and lack of awareness of environmental impacts provide little
incentive to users to choose good scarcity responses or technology and
discourage demand reductions.274
The implementation of new policy preferences like water markets,
metering, and price incentives are also seriously hampered by weak
management and a general lack of monitoring and control over water
uses.'n In particular, the present licensing system provides neither incentive
nor legal guarantee of a minimum supply of water for the following year
(inter-temporal allocation) for irrigation farmers who are willing to reduce
water consumption during droughts. Also, lack of institutional
transparency and conflict between distinct parts of the administration with
270. Sumpsi, supra note 117.
271. Los agentes sociales rechazan la tasa destinada a los gestores de agua, EL PAIS, July 16,1998.
272. In particular, the attitude of the Seville water company toward this option is still
hesitant, despite the recent legal changes opening up new possibilities for inter-user transfers
and the inclusion of this option in the 1998 Drought Manual. At the same time, water
conservation measures are not developed within integrated programs of demand management
but as isolated measures without defined objectives and calendars. On the other hand, the
stable reduction of demand would have clear repercussions on a water company's financial
balance. So far, the sustained low level of consumption that has persisted in Seville even after
the drought emergencies has been absorbed by water price increases. However, this solution
has high political costs for the municipal government that must approve them and results in
the municipal water company's ambivalent attitude. See EMASESA, MANUAL DESEQUA (1998).
273. See Plataforma del Guadalquivir, at http://www.sevsigloxxi.org/plataforma (Mar. 15,
2002).
274. Id.
275. Professor Ramon Llamas asserts that the state of underground waters in Spain is in
chaos, Arag6n Press, at http://www.circe.cps.unizar.es/spanish/waterweb/dossier.html
(June 14, 2001).
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different political affiliations and between the administration and users or
citizens also contribute to the maintenance of the status quo. 6
But, of all the features of the traditional water community, the
social hegemony of the irrigation sector is the most important. It explains
the emphasis placed on the negative effects of full cost recovery water
tariffs for agriculture as well as the sustained increase in irrigation lands2'
that fly in the face of more general trends and the preferences set out in the
National Irrigation Plan. After emerging from the last drought streamlined
and strong, the agrarian sector can now rely on a well-consolidated
structure, as well as new ad hoc pressure groups and alliances to push its
agenda.m
SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTIVE RESPONSES
The most promising responses to water scarcity are likely to result
from demand management, contingency planning, and inter-sector and
inter-temporal allocation of water stocks. As a result of these catalysts for
institutional change, in the lower Guadalquivir basin innovative water
management practices (whose degrees of development vary) have
emerged.79
For example, demand management measures have been promoted
with greater energy in the Seville water supply system since the mid-
1990s. Similarly, a general downward trend in urban water use could be
related to increased public awareness and could become the basis for a
long-term water conservation strategy.' As regards contingency planning,
the main development in this field is the elaboration of a drought manual
by the Seville water company.8 2 The manual proposes criteria for defining
276. PWREZ Diaz Er AL, 1996, supra note 23, at 61-64.
277. To a large extent, this increase has been uncontrolled-without the corresponding
water licences. In some cases the Andalusian regional government has officially supported it,
though. One of the main factors behind this growth is the current European agricultural
subsidisation policy.
278. Although their infrastructure agenda has dominated the discourses of the main
political parties and media, none of the water schemes that they were demanding have been
carried out since 1995. Thus, a paradoxical situation exists in which an apparent social and
political quasi-unanimity about the need for hydraulic infrastructure exists, but there is also
a real stagnation in its implementation.
279. del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 297-98.
280. del Moral Ituarte & Giansante, supra note 245, at 99.
281. However, the urban development model (suburbanisation) currently in force in
Seville, as in other Spanish and European cities, also represents a clear obstacle to the reduction
of urban water demand.
282. See EMASESA, supra note 272.
[Vol. 42
INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION
different phases of a drought according to increasing severity and also
proposes correspondingly severe conservation measures.2"
But the response to water scarcity that lies at the centre of the recent
water debate concerns inter-sector and inter-temporal water re-allocation.2"
This response came to the forefront because of the unequal distribution of
water resources among sectors with different levels of economic and social
status and because of the 1999 amendment to the Water Act, which
prepares the ground for water transfers between users.' The idea that
these transfers may increase the overall efficiency of water allocation is
beginning to be accepted, albeit with some reticence.' But more turmoil
lies ahead as the introduction of water markets is likely to elicit divergent
reactions from differently situated irrigation farmers. Socio-demographic
features, farm size, crop type, technology, source of supply, and
geographical position in the water system will all impact different irrigation
farmers in different ways and the group could experience more tension,
especially if water were to become even more scarce.'
CONCLUSIONS
In the Lower Guadalquivir basin, as in the rest of Spain, a resource-
oriented water management model with deep historical roots, the
"hydraulic paradigm," has dominated so far.' This model has had a
distinct impact on how the risk of water scarcity is perceived and on the
vulnerability of the water system, which is increasing as a result of users'
demand-hungry attitude. In this paradigm, droughts have traditionally
been viewed as expressions of a "structural deficit," a permanent imbalance
between water demand and water supply. This view has led water
managers and water planners to neglect the crisis management and
contingency planning areas. Nonetheless, the idea that the water
management system faces a serious crisis is becoming more widespread
among water managers and stakeholders alike. The last drought increased
awareness of the water system's vulnerability and became a catalyst for
social participation in the water debate.
The uncontrolled expansion of irrigated lands over the past two
decades also had important ramifications for current water allocation
283. Ministry of the Environment, supra note, 38, at 839.
284. 1999 Water Act, B.O.E., 1999, 298, art. 61 bis.
285. Id.
286. del Moral Ituarte et al., supra note 104, at 299-300.
287. Id. at 292-94.
288. This term describes a type of water development policy that advocates building new
water infrastructure (dams that make more water available) instead of managing demand (by
increasing water efficiency or campaigning in favour of water savings).
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methods. The 1999 irrigation season was a breaking point for urban water
users; for the first time, water allocation decisions that put the basin's urban
water supply at risk were harshly criticized. This criticism also has
important implications for current water management, which needs to
change in order to be able to guarantee a basic urban water supply. As it
now stands, the water system struggles to handle today's risks with
traditional water management approaches.
Climate change would further challenge the current water
management model. Despite the increase in rainfall, temperature
variability, and persistence of dry spells in the Guadalquivir river basin
over the last three decades of the twentieth century, climate change has not
yet become a standard consideration in Spanish water planning. If climate
change were integrated into the planning, this would probably result in a
greater push to address the current system's deficiencies. In particular, if
the process put more emphasis on inter-annual reservoir operation and if
groundwater issues were included in the global management model, it
might be possible to mitigate the effects of the lower rainfall and the lower
water flows that global warming might bring.
Water allocation could become a useful tool for increasing the water
system's overall efficiency and ability to cope with scarcity. The importance
of efficiency and the ability to deal with scarcity will become more
important since competition for water among metropolitan and coastal
users; among urban, environmental, and agricultural users; among inland
users; as well as among different irrigation zones, according to location,
crop type, size, technology, and efficiency is likely to continue increasing.
There is a new provision requiring some economic analysis of water uses
that will be used to fashion some form of cost recovery, probably partial
cost recovery. When this provision becomes effective, when the EU
Framework Directive has been fully implemented, it would positively affect
both the current concept of water deficit and the current priorities for
allocating water. According to economic modelling of the situation in the
lower Guadalquivir basin, the efficiency gains from re-allocation over time,
gains associated with increasing the certainty of water rights to saving
water left in reservoirs for use in a subsequent year, could overshadow
gains in efficiency achieved by water trades that occur in a single season.
But at present, the licensing system provides neither the incentive nor the
legal security necessary for irrigation communities to be willing to
defer/reduce their water consumption.
The irrigation community emerged from the last drought
streamlined and more powerful. The irrigation sector opposes the prospect
of reduced demand and claims that it unduly burdens traditional
agricultural interests and jeopardizes its well-advertised, deep-seated,
traditional values. As a result of the irrigation community's skilful media
management, a considerable amount of publicity is focused on the negative
[Vol. 42
Summer 2002] INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION 563
effects cost recovery water tariffs would have on agricultural interests.
Similarly, structural solutions continue to dominate mainstream political
party and media agendas. But while these traditional attitudes persist, they
face more opposition than in the past; for example, none of the water
schemes (mainly reservoirs) demanded by the irrigation community has
been built since 1995.
In summary, Spain's water system is facing a crisis. The innovative
measures of demand management and contingency planning are viewed by
the incumbent institutions and actors as viable and even necessary but still
insufficient to completely overcome the inherent "structural deficit." The
incumbents continue to clamour for resource augmentation as the better
long-term solution to water scarcity. In the midst of this ongoing tension,
the stress on Spain's water system grows larger as does the threat of global
warming. Hopefully, Spanish stakeholders will realize that what is needed
to face the future is a water management system that is willing and
politically able to use all the tools available to adapt to water scarcity.
